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ABSTRACT
We present Heartbeats-2-Bits (H2B), which is a system for securely
pairing wearable devices by generating a shared secret key from
the skin vibrations caused by heartbeat. This work is motivated
by potential power saving opportunity arising from the fact that
heartbeat intervals can be detected energy-efficiently using inex-
pensive and power-efficient piezo sensors, which obviates the need
to employ complex heartbeat monitors such as Electrocardiogram
or Photoplethysmogram. Indeed, our experiments show that piezo
sensors can measure heartbeat intervals on many different body
locations including chest, wrist, waist, neck and ankle. Unfortu-
nately, we also discover that the heartbeat interval signal captured
by piezo vibration sensors has low Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) be-
cause they are not designed as precision heartbeat monitors, which
becomes the key challenge for H2B. To overcome this problem, we
first apply a quantile function-based quantization method to fully
extract the useful entropy from the noisy piezo measurements. We
then propose a novel Compressive Sensing-based reconciliation
method to correct the high bit mismatch rates between the two in-
dependently generated keys caused by low SNR. We prototype H2B
using off-the-shelf piezo sensors and evaluate its performance on a
dataset collected from different body positions of 23 participants.
Our results show that H2B has a pairing success rate of 95.6%. We
also analyze and demonstrate H2B’s robustness against three types
of attacks. Finally, our power measurements show that H2B is very
power-efficient.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With recent advances in wireless sensor networks and embedded
computing technologies, the popularity of wearable devices, such as
FitBit and AppleWatch, is skyrocketing. A recent survey [33] shows
that the wearable market is beaming with hundreds of different
types of products including smart glasses, smart jewelery, electronic
garments, smart shoes, skin patches, and even implanted medical
devices (IMDs). We are heading to a future where users are expected
to have more than one wearable device continuously monitoring
their bodies and providing advanced health and other services [14].
In such multi-wearable scenario, wearable devices may deal
with private sensory information for a range of tasks, such as data
aggregation, sensing coordination, data relaying (from body to
cloud). To protect private information, body area networks (BAN)
usually rely on symmetric cryptographic keys for secure commu-
nication. Traditional key distribution approaches that require pre-
deployment in the network initialization stage are not scalable
with growing number of wearables. Exploiting biometrics such as
gait (e.g, Walkie-Talkie [42] and BANDANA [32]), Electromyogram
(e.g, EMG-KEY [44]), and ECG (e.g., Heart-to-Heart [30]) as shared
key sources has became a hot research field because biometrics is
inherent, unique and hard to obtain or spoof.
In this paper, we explore and demonstrate the feasibility of using
piezo sensors to detect heartbeat signal. We show that the minor
vibrations caused by heartbeats can be detected on multiple body
locations such as chest, wrist, waist, neck and ankle. Followed by
that, we design and implement a key generation system, H2B, that
can exploit the detected heartbeat to generate the same keys for
two wearable devices on different body locations of the same user.
1.1 Motivations
Why heartbeats? Although various kinds of biometrics such as
gait and Electromyogram (EMG) have been explored to pair de-
vices, there exist some limitations. First, although gait-based au-
thentication/key generation systems have been extensively stud-
ied [32, 41, 42], most existing work validate their systems on a
limited dataset. It is still not clear whether gait-based methods ap-
ply to large-scale population. In contrast, authors of [6, 24, 30] have
shown that inter-pulse interval (IPI), i.e., the interval between two
peaks in heartbeat signal, is highly random and can be used as a
random source to generate keys.
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In addition, some systems pose extra burden on the user. For
example, gait-based methods require users to walk for a while to
generate keys. EMG-based methods require the users to perform a
gesture such as clenching the fist as a part of the pairing process.
In comparison, heartbeat signal is spontaneous and thus can be
measured at anytime and in anywhere.
Why piezo sensors? In current wearable devices, IPI readings
are usually sampled by Electrocardiogram (ECG) or Photoplethys-
mogram (PPG) sensors. Meanwhile, studies also show that heartbeat
signal can be measured by accelerometers in the smartphone and
used to extract IPI [28, 36]. Unfortunately, the accelerometer-based
methods can measure seismocardiogram (SCG) only, which
is chest movement in response to the heartbeat, and fail to de-
tect heartbeats in other locations such as wrist. Furthermore, an-
other advantage of piezo vibration sensor over ECG biosensor and
accelerometer is its cost-efficiency and energy-efficiency, which
makes it more suitable for resource-constrained wearable devices.
Although most current wearable devices are not fitted with piezo
sensors, we have observed an increasing number of commercial
products equipped with piezoelectric energy harvesters (PEHs)
such as AMPY [1], SOLEPOWER [34], and KINERGIZER [19] to
reduce dependency on batteries. Recent work has demonstrated that
AC voltage generated by PEH can be effectively used for sensing
and analyzing body vibrations [18]. Additionally, researchers are
considering using wearable piezo sensors to monitor biometrics
such as respiration [16]. Therefore, we can expect that the PEH or
piezo sensors will be embedded in wearable devices to enable more
applications in the future.
An inherent problem with biometrics is that the measurement is
never perfect [6]. Parallel measurements of the same source by mul-
tiple sensors at the same time differ from each other, though they
maintain a certain proximity. Unlike ECG sensors or accelerome-
ters, piezo sensors are not inherently designed for precise motion
detection. Therefore, the IPI measured by the piezo sensors contains
significant noise which becomes the key challenge for designing a
system that requires 100% bit match between the keys generated
by two devices independently. The low SNR poses two challenges.
Firstly, as the measurements contain significant random noise, the
amount of entropy in them, which is critically important for the
quality of the keys, will be reduced significantly. Secondly, the
noisy measurements lead to significant number of bit mismatches
between the two keys. The mismatches will either cause key gen-
eration failure or increase the time required to generate matching
keys, which in turn decreases user experience.
To this end, we apply a quantile function-based quantization
method to fully extract useful entropy, and propose a novel Com-
pressive Sensing (CS)-based reconciliation method to correct mis-
matches in quantized bits. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that explores and demonstrates the feasibility of using
piezo vibration sensors to detect heartbeat signal and use the signal
to generate keys.
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• We conduct the first study to experimentally analyze the
potential of piezo-based IPIs. Our result shows that piezo-
based IPIs have smaller entropy and higher mismatch rate
than those measured by ECG. As a result, the shared key
generation using the piezo-based IPIs takes longer time and
has a lower success rate. [Section 2]
• We propose H2B, a symmetric key generation system exploit-
ing IPIs captured by polyvinylidene difluoride (PVDF) piezo
sensor. We apply a quantile function-based quantization to
fully extract the entropy and propose a novel CS-based rec-
onciliation to overcome the high level of variation inherent
in the piezo sensor’s measurements.[Section 4]
• We provide a proof of concept implementation of H2B using
off-the-shelf piezo sensors and evaluate H2B with 23 par-
ticipants. Our results show that: 1. Quantile function-based
quantization can extract 2.9 bits entropy from each IPI while
a naive Gray-coded representation can extract 1 bit only; 2.
CS-based reconciliation significantly improves the 128-bit
key generation success rate from a low 34.2% to a 95.6%
compared to traditional error correction methods. [Section
5.1]
• We conduct comprehensive attack analysis to show that H2B
is highly robust against typical attacks.[Section 5.7]
• Finally, we demonstrate that H2B is very power-efficient for
sampling IPI and generating symmetric keys.[Section 5.8]
2 FEASIBILITY STUDY
2.1 ECG
Figure 1(a) depicts two typical ECG waveforms of a healthy person.
A heartbeat cycle in ECG is characterized by the combination of
three graphical deflections (Q, R and S waves), which is also known
as QRS complex. The R-peak is the most crucial feature of an ECG
waveform as it corresponds to the ”beat” in a heartbeat. The time
interval between two consecutive R-peaks is referred to inter-pulse
interval (IPI).
The principle of using piezo vibration sensors to detect IPIs
can be explained as follows. On the chest and waist, the heart
contraction will cause regular vibrations in the chest which is called
seismocardiogram (SCG). Such vibrations can be detected by the
piezo vibration sensor attached to the chest and waist as shown in
Figure 1(b). After each heartbeat, the blood is ejected from the heart
into arteries all over the body. In order to accommodate the blood,
the arteries need to expand and recoil regularly which produce
ballistocardiogram (BCG) signal [8]. The expansion and recoiling
effect, also known as the blood pressure pulse, can be measured
on skin near arteries (e.g. the radial artery in the wrist). Therefore,
if we attach a piezo sensor near the artery in other locations (e.g.,
wrist), we can extract IPI information from the measurements as
shown in Figure 1(c).
From Figure 1, we also find that the curves of heartbeat cycle
measured from different body locations do not follow the same
pattern as typical QRS complex. Nevertheless, we can apply a local
peak point (either maximum or minimum) to represent each heart-
beat and further extract IPIs. Then there is a question: How accurate
is the IPI measured by a piezo sensor? To this end, we compare the
measurement precision of a piezo sensor with a commercial heart
rate monitor device Polar H101 as the ground-truth. Our results
from 23 participants show that the RMSE of IPIs measured by piezo
1https://www.polar.com/au-en/products/accessories/h10_heart_rate_sensor
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sensors is 6ms only (dataset is explained in Section 5.2). Figure 2
plots a series of IPI measured by the piezo sensor and the ECG
biosensor (i.e., Polar H10) respectively. We can see that piezo-based
IPIs are very close to those measured by the ECG biosensor.
Based on the analysis above, it is feasible to use piezo sensors
to measure accurate IPIs. However, there still exist two problems.
Firstly, the IPIs measured form different body locations are slightly
different. For example, the IPI measured in Figure 1(c) (wrist) is
slightly longer than that in Figure 1(b) (chest). Secondly, the IPIs
measured by the piezo sensors has some small deviations as can
be seen from Figure 2. These two problems will lead to the low
entropy in the signals and high mismatch rate between the two
keys, which we will discuss next.
(a) Typical ECG waveform and IPI
(b) An IPI measured from chest (captured by a piezo sensor)
(c) An IPI measured from wrist (captured by a piezo sensor)
Figure 1: IPIs in different representations.
Figure 2: Piezo sensor v.s. ECG biosensor.
2.2 Piezo-based IPI as Secret Source
The secret source for symmetric key based secure communication
protocols must satisfy randomness and proximity conditions [6].
Firstly, for security purpose, the generated key must be crypto-
graphically random, or independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.). Secondly, for usability purpose, the final keys generated
from the same source independently by two legitimate parties (i.e.,
Alice and Bob) must agree. In terms of randomness, IPI is random
according to the features of heart rate variability [26]. Furthermore,
previous studies [30, 40] on PhysioBank2 database have demon-
strated that IPI can be used to extract random keys. In terms of
proximity, IPI measured from different locations are close to each
other because, intuitively, they measure the same heartbeat sig-
nal. Therefore, IPI measured by piezo sensors at least contains a
certain amount of information that satisfies both randomness and
proximity conditions.
To this end, we benchmark piezo-based IPIs against ECG-based
IPIs to show the potential of piezo-based IPIs as a secret source. We
built several prototype wearable devices and collected a preliminary
dataset. We use Heart2Heart (H2H) [30], which is a state-of-the-art
ECG-based system, as a baseline and follow its quantization process,
which uses the Gray-code representation of raw IPI values.
We use entropy and mismatch rate as the evaluation metrics.
The entropy denotes information contains in each bit. To satisfy
the randomness condition, the entropy for each extracted bit must
be sufficiently high. We empirically select an entropy threshold of
0.95 to determine valid bits. The mismatch rate is the probability of
mismatched bits over all quantization bits produced from the IPI
measurements captured by Alice and Bob respectively. To satisfy
the proximity condition, the mismatch rate must be sufficiently
small. We empirically select an mismatch rate threshold of 20%
as the proximity condition. Table 1 shows the entropy and the
mismatch rate of Gray-coded bits of piezo-based and ECG-based
IPI respectively. In terms of the entropy, both piezo-based IPI and
ECG-based IPI have 5 high-entropy bits (Bit 1-5) that can be used as
valid keys by satisfying the randomness condition of ≥ 95% entropy
per bit. In terms of the mismatch rate, however, bits generated from
the piezo-based IPI have much higher mismatch rates than those of
the ECG-based IPI. For example, the mismatch rate of Bit 4 is 32.8%
for the piezo-based IPI while the same bit extracted its ECG-based
counterpart has 0.9% mismatch rate only. Therefore, if we adopt
the method in [30] directly, we have to discard 4 least significant
bits and keep Bit 5 only to satisfy the proximity condition with an
mismatch rate of ≤ 20%. The result highlights that piezo-based IPIs
as a secret source has a very significantly lower SNR compared to
ECG, thus faces the challenges of significantly lower entropy
and higher bit mismatch rate.
Table 1: Comparison of entropy and mismatch rate.
Bit piezo-based IPI ECG-based IPI (H2H Results)Entropy Mismatch Rate Entropy Mismatch Rate
8 (MSB) 0.05 0% 0.27 0.1%
7 0.44 1% 0.80 0.3%
6 0.64 6.9% 0.90 0.4%
5 0.98 14.4% 0.98 0.6%
4 1 32.8% 1 0.9%
3 1 42.8% 1 1.8%
2 1 45.2% 1 3.9%
1 (LSB) 1 49.8% 1 8%
2https://physionet.org/physiobank/
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Figure 3: System Overview. (1) IPI extraction (2) Quantiza-
tion (3) Reconciliation.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
3.1 Trust Model
We envision the usage of H2B primarily for wearable devices that
have close contact with user’s body as these devices can detect
and measure user’s heartbeat pulses and further use them to estab-
lish common cryptographic keys for secure communications. For
example, as shown in Figure 3, a user (Joe) gets up from bed and
wears a smart wristband (Alice) on his wrist. He wishes to read
some information from his pacemaker (Bob) which is inside his
chest. Therefore, Joe launches H2B APP in the wristband, and after
a short while Alice and Bob automatically establish a secret key
by measuring Joe’s IPI. Finally, Bob transfers private data to Alice
via the established secure channel protected by the common secret
key. In a mobile environment, the demand for this type of temporal
association is increasing. Therefore, H2B is well suited for frequent
and short-lived data exchange between wearable devices. Moreover,
it provides an unobtrusive, friendly, spontaneous key generation
approach for users.
Same as previous biometrics-based key generation systems [30,
42], we assume that all on-body devices that can measure the heart-
beat signals of a user are trustworthy. As discussed in [23], an
attacker can neither control the vibration recorded locally by these
devices nor perfectly estimate it; otherwise the protection of legiti-
mate devices is impossible. The user is assumed to be capable of
detecting such attacks if an attacker tries to modify the on-body
devices or place an adversary device on her. In fact, there are a
number of approaches to protect such attacks. For example, in or-
der to make sure the devices have not been modified, the device
manufacturers may apply tamper-resistant techniques [29]. ARM
TrustZone extension may also be used to ensure the integrity of
the sensors [12, 20].
3.2 Adversary Model
We assume the presence of a strong attacker Eve during the key
generation process of H2B. Eve has full knowledge of the system
and control of the communication channel, i.e., she may monitor,
jam, and modify messages at will. The detection of jamming at-
tacks is out of the scope of this paper as jamming attacks have
been extensively studied and we may adopt the methods in [25, 43].
Compromising integrity such as modifying messages can be pre-
vented by implementing Message authentication code (MAC) in
transmitted messages. Apart from these attacks, there are three
types of attacks particularly targeting H2B that may be used by
Eve to recover the secret key: passive eavesdropping attacks, active
presentation attacks and active video magnification attacks.
(1) Passive eavesdropping attacks. A passive attacker under-
stands the key generation mechanism and may monitor the
communication between Alice and Bob. By eavesdropping
the public components of key generation, Eve tries to gener-
ate a key based on her own heartbeat information and use
this key to pair with one or both of the legitimate devices.
In order to counter this type of attacks, H2B needs to make
sure the extracted keys that are distinctive among different
users.
(2) Active presentation attacks. A presentation attacker may
access historical IPI data of a user. Eve attempts to pair with
legitimate devices by submitting key generated from histor-
ical data. In order to counter this type of attacks, the keys
generated by H2B need to provide forward secrecy.
(3) Active video attacks. A recent work presented a video-
based head pulse motion detection method [2], which is able
to detect heartbeat signals by magnifying subtle head motion
caused by the influx of blood at each heartbeat. Therefore, an
active video attacker may observe and film the head of a user,
and use this method to extract IPIs to generate the same key
as that produced by a legitimate device. Active video attacks
may be considered as one form of side-channel attacks.
We will provide a more detailed discussion on the robustness of
H2B against these attacks in Section 5.7.
4 PROTOCOL DESIGN
As shown in Figure 3, the protocol comprises of three stages: IPI
extraction, quantization, and reconciliation. In the IPI extraction
stage, we collect heart beat signal via piezo sensors and extract a se-
ries of consecutive IPIs. In quantization stage, the IPIs are quantized
into bit vectors. IPI extraction and quantization stages are executed
by Alice and Bob independently. Due to the measurement noise,
there are usually mismatches in the quantized bits between the bit
vectors produced by Alice and Bob respectively. Therefore, in the
reconciliation stage Alice and Bob exchange a certain amount of
information to correct all mismatches and generate a bit-for-bit
matching key. Before we discuss the three stages of H2B in de-
tails, we summarize the mathematical symbol notations used in
this paper in Table 2.
Table 2: Symbol notations
Symbol Meaning
F (·) cumulative distribution function
I (·) quantile function or inverse cumulative distribution function
χ , X original IPI value and its domain (e.g. time)
Ti quantization threshold
n number of quantized IPI values
H (·) entropy function
N signal length of bit vector
M length of compressed key
Q security threshold
P effective threshold
x bit vector (or raw key) after quantization
y compressed key
Φ compressing matrix
S sparsity, the number of non-zero elements in a vector
SAlice sparsity of key Alice xAlice
S∆A,B , S∆A,E sparsity of mismatch vector between Alice and Bob, and between Alice and Eve
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4.1 IPI Extraction
As discussed earlier in Section 2.1, although piezo sensors at dif-
ferent locations can capture heartbeat signal simultaneously, the
measurements do not perfectly match and contain significant noise.
To accurately extract IPI values, we first apply a Savitzky-Golay
(SG) filter on the raw signal to reduce the impact of noise, which
can smooth the original curves without changing the peak locations
in the curves. Then, we locate each heartbeat using a local peak
detection algorithm. IPI values can be finally computed from the
time difference of consecutive heartbeats.
Synchronization is required to ensure all legitimate devices cap-
ture IPIs at the same time. In H2B, the synchronization of Alice
and Bob is achieved using a time-slotted channel hopping-based
(TSCH) [11] time synchronization mechanism3. With TSCH, the
timers in the devices are synchronized when they join a network.
4.2 Quantization
A common method of converting IPIs into bits is directly using
the Gray-code representation of IPI values [3, 30]. However, as dis-
cussed in [40], the keys generated from such method are actually
not random because IPI values fluctuates around the average value
and follow a normal distribution. Therefore, attackers may per-
form statistical analysis and gain significant amount of knowledge
about the key. For example, since the average of IPIs is 850ms, let
us assume the first IPI value is 840ms and thus its corresponding
Gray code is ”1011101100”. If the second IPI value is 860ms, its corre-
sponding Gray code is ”1011110010”. We can see the the first 5 digits
of the two produced Gray codes are exactly the same. Therefore, the
randomness lies only in the lower digits. To address this problem
and fully exploit the potential of keying material, we first convert
the IPI readings into a dataset that follows a uniform distribution.
Then the converted IPI values are quantized into bits using Gray
code representation. Since the data used to generate the final key
follow a uniform distribution instead of a normal distribution, all
bits in the extracted keys have high entropy.
In details, we start at converting the raw IPI readings which
follow a normal distribution into a dataset that follows uniform
distribution. We use a quantile function approach similar to [40].
Specifically, we segment the normal distribution into a set of n
discrete values with an equal probability 1n . Suppose we measure
a series of IPI readings X = {χ1, χ2, · · · , χN }. The cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of these readings is F (χ ). The function
F (χ ) gives us the probability p that χ will take a value ≤ χ . Instead,
the quantile function which is defined as I (p) = in f {χ ∈ R : p ≤
F (χ )} does the opposite: it produces a threshold value χ below
which the random draws from χ will fall into p percent of the
time. Therefore, we can simply obtain the thresholds by choosing
p = ( 1n , 2n , ..., 1) as follows:
Ti = I (p) p = ( 1
n
,
2
n
, ..., 1) (1)
where Ti is the i-th threshold. The design of quantization now
becomes finding a proper n. As the extracted keys cannot exceed
the theoretic entropy in the source, the number of quantized IPI
values is thereby determined by the total entropy of the original
3Other time synchronization methods such as Cheepsync [35] may also be used.
IPI values. Therefore, we choose n = 2 ⌊H (X )⌋ where H (X ) is the
entropy of IPI values and ⌊H (X )⌋ is the maximum integer smaller
than H (x).
After finding the thresholds, the original IPI values falling into
the i-th segmentation are quantized into i − 1. For example, the IPI
values falling into the first segmentation are quantized into 0, and
the IPI values falling into the last segmentation are quantized into
n−1. In order to distinguish IPI values before and after quantization,
we term the IPI values after quantization as quantized IPIs. Figure 4
illustrates this process. Figure 4(a) shows that the original IPI values
follow a normal distribution similar as [40]. After quantization, the
quantized IPIs roughly follow a uniform distribution as shown in
Figure 4(b). The mismatches are caused by the noise.
Finally, we use Gray code to encode the quantized IPI values.
After this step, each IPI value is represented by a bit strings con-
taining ‘0’ and ‘1’. Then, all the bit strings generated from collected
IPIs are concatenated to form an initial key xAlice and xBob , which
are generated on two devices independently.
Here we briefly illustrate the advantage of this quantization
process. We apply the above quantization process on the same data
used in Section 2.2 and plot the results in Table 3. Compared to the
results in Table 1, though our method can generate 6 bits per IPI
only, we find that the first 3 most significant bits (i.e.m Bits 4, 5,
6) have high entropy and low mismatch rates. The result suggests
that our method improves key generation rate by 3 times because
a naive Gray code representation can only generate 1 bit with
high entropy (Bit 5) based on the analysis in Section 2.2. However,
quantization does not remove the random noise of original IPI
values completely. From Table 3, we can see random noise still
cluster in least significant bits (Bit 1-3) after quantization and causes
high mismatch rates. Therefore, H2B discards the least 3 bits and
keep Bits 4 to 6 only. In other words, H2B extracts 3 bits per IPI.
In next section, we will address the challenge of the mismatches
(between 10% and 20%) in Bits 4 to 6.
(a) Histogram of original IPI (b) Histogram of quantized IPI
Figure 4: Illustration of quantization: original IPIs follow a
normal distribution. After quantization, the quantized IPIs
roughly follow a uniform distribution.
4.3 Reconciliation
4.3.1 Principles of Compressive Sensing. Before we introduce the
CS-based reconciliation method to correct mismatches, we first re-
view the principles of CS briefly. CS is an information theory [4, 37]
that proposes a method to recover a high dimension sparse signal
from a small number of (i.e., low dimension) measurements. Let
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Table 3: Results of quantization process.
Bit Entropy Mismatch Rate
6 (MSB) 0.96 12.9%
5 0.96 12.4%
4 1 19.4%
3 1 35.8%
2 1 34.8%
1 (LSB) 1 43.2%
x ∈ RN be an unknown data vector,y ∈ RM be a measurement vec-
tor, and Φ ∈ RM×N be a projection matrix from a higher dimension
(N ) to a lower dimension (M), where M << N . Here, both vector
y and matrix Φ are given, and the unknown vector x needs to be
determined. We can then write the problem in a linear form as:
y = Φx . (2)
SinceM < N , Eq. (2) is under-determined, and is impossible to be
solved in a general form.
CS imposes the requirement that data vector x is sparse; namely,
most of the elements in x are zeros. Let S denote the number of
non-zeros in x , then x is sparse if S << N . S in CS is termed as
sparsity. CS theory states that we can recover data vector x with an
overwhelming probability by solving the following ℓ1 minimization
problem:
xˆ = argmin
x
∥x ∥1 subject to ∥y − Φx ∥2 < ϵ, (3)
where ϵ is noise and provided Conditions C1 and C2 as follows.
• C1. Φ must obey the restricted isometry property (RIP). For
example, Φ satisfies RIP if each element in Φ is ±1with equal
probability, i.e., symmetric Bernoulli distribution.
• C2.M > S ∗ loд(N /S).
Note that C2 is a sufficient condition, and Wang et. al show that the
necessary condition is [37]:
• C3.M > S .
A symmetric key secure communication protocol requires a
bit-for-bit equal key for Alice and Bob. After quantization, Alice
and Bob generate the bit vectors (xAlice ,xBob ∈ ZN2 ) respectively.
However, we usually have xAlice ≈ xBob in practice (see Table 3).
In the context of information reconciliation, our intuition is that
the mismatched vector between two keys xAlice and xBob is
sparse as they are very close to each other (e.g., ≤ 20% for
Bits 4 to 6 in Table 3), therefore can be recovered from Eq.
(3) efficiently.
4.3.2 Information Reconciliation Protocol with Compressive Sensing.
Figure 5 illustrates the flowchart of proposed information recon-
ciliation protocol. The roles of Alice and Bob are interchangeable.
The proposed method is inspired by the application of CS in error
correction [10], but our approach is based on different assumption
(i.e., the mismatched vector is sparse) and is therefore different. In
fact, the proposed method may be applied in all kinds of symmetric
key generation system for information reconciliation.
Firstly, Alice and Bob derive their own key candidate vectors
xAlice and xBob from local observation independently. Secondly,
they project the vectors to lower dimension spaces (i.e., fromN toM ,
whereN >> M), with Eq. (2) respectively, namelyyAlice = ΦxAlice
and yBob = ΦxBob , where Φ is a known key generation protocol
parameter (i.e., a known Bernoulli matrix consisting of ±1 with
equal probability). Thirdly, Alice transmits yAlice to Bob via an
unauthenticated channel. On receiving yAlice , Bob calculates the
mismatched vector ∆yA,B = yAlice − yBob in a lower dimension
space. According to the proximity condition in Section 2.2, the
mismatched vector in a higher dimension space ∆xA,B = xAlice ⊕
xBob will have less than 20% non-zero elements only (sparse!), i.e.,
a small S∆A,B . Furthermore, if project matrix Φ satisfies Conditions
C1 and C2 in Section 4.3.1, ∆xA,B can be recovered using Eq. (3)
as:
ˆ∆xA,B = arg min
∆xA,B
∥∆xA,B ∥1 s .t .∥∆yA,B⊕Φ∆xA,B ∥2 < ϵ . (4)
Finally, with ∆xA,B , Bob can correct mismatched bits by deriving a
new key x ′Bob = xBob ⊕ ∆xA,B , and x ′Bob = xAlice .
As the compressed keyyAlice is transmitted via a public channel,
Eve may eavesdrop it. Therefore, there are two obvious potential
vulnerabilities of this reconciliation protocol.
Vulnerability 1: Eve may reconstruct xAlice from yAlice di-
rectly using Eq.(3).
Vulnerability 2: Eve may perform the three types of attacks
discussed in Section 3.2 to obtain IPI values. Then she can use them
to derive her own key, i.e.,yEve , to calculate ∆yA,E = yAlice −yEve ,
where yEve = ΦxEve . Therefore, she may recover ∆xA,E with Eq.
(4) by replacing ∆xA,B and yA,B with ∆xA,E and yA,E respectively,
and obtain xAlice .
The extreme case to consider a binary vector as a non-sparse
vector is that it has exactly 50% ones and 50% zeros. Figure 6 shows
that xAlice usually contains approximately 50% ones and 50% zeros
after quantization, which implies that xAlice is not sparse. It is
extremely hard for a potential attacker to exploit Vulnerability
1. On the other hand, the success rate to exploit Vulnerability 2
depends on how Eve can approximate inherent IPI without the
contact of user’s body. In Section 3.2, we assume Eve can perform
three types of attacks.
We now quantitatively demonstrate that these two vulnera-
bilities can be addressed by properly choosing the value of pa-
rameter M . Let us define P = S∆A,B ∗ loд(N /S∆A,B ) and Q =
min(SAlice , S∆A,E ), respectively. We have:
Corollary 1. The CS-based reconciliation method is perfectly
effective (i.e., Bob can recover ∆xA,B and xAlice successfully) and
secure (i.e., Eve is unable to recover ∆xA,E and xAlice successfully)
if
P < M < Q (5)
Proof: If Bob cannot recover ∆xA,B and xAlice with a Φ that
satisfies Condition C1 andM > P , it is contradictory to Condition
C2, which defines the sufficient condition for successful CS decod-
ing with ℓ1 minimization. If Eve can recover ∆xA,E and xAlice with
M < Q , it is contradictory to Condition C3, which defines the nec-
essary condition for successful CS decoding with ℓ1 minimization
for both Vulnerabilities 1 and 2 because Q is the minimum of
SAlice , S∆A,E , which are the necessary conditions for successful
xAlice recoveries in Vulnerabilities 1 and 2 respectively.
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Figure 5: Reconciliation protocol.
Figure 6: Bit distribution in xAlice based on evaluation
dataset collected in Section 5.2.
The design for an effective and secure CS-based reconciliation
becomes a problem to find a suitableM . The upper bound Q is the
secure threshold and the lower bound P is the effective threshold.
These two thresholds are determined by the population of mis-
matches among legitimate devices and attackers. Assume that H2B
aims to generate a 128-bit key, i.e., N = 128. Figure 7 shows the dis-
tribution of P andQ in our dataset introduced in Section 5.2. While
we cannot find an optimal value of M that satisfies Corollary 1,
we deliberatively selected a smallM value of 50 so thatM < Q to
cover Vulnerabilities 1 and 2. However, there exists a small chance
(4.8%) thatM ≤ P , implying that there is 4.8% possibility that the
proposed CS-based reconciliation fails to correct all mismatches
between xAlice and xBob . Note that we just consider two possi-
ble vulnerabilities and three types of attacks. Corollary 1 and the
conditionM < Q aim to protect two defined vulnerabilities only.
As the attacker Eve has the full control of the public communica-
tion channel, she may modify yAlice in the reconciliation step.
To maintain message integrity, a message authentication code
(MAC) method is implemented to verify the message [5]. Here,
H2B codes yAlice to LAlice = {yAlice ,MAC(xAlice ,yAlice )}, by
Figure 7: Sparsity when N = 128.
treating xAlice as the shared secret. On receiving LAlice , Bob can
obtain xAlice as discussed above and also protect the integrity and
the authenticity of the message via the MACmethod. If the message
is modified, the derived x ′Bob will be different from xAlice so that
Bob cannot produce the correct LAlice . The message is thereby
discarded. The MAC method also allows Bob to examine the recon-
ciliation results. As shown in Figure 5, Bob will notify Alice for the
final result to determine whether the key generation is successful.
Finally, we apply SHA2-256 hashing algorithm on the successfully
generated key to further amplify privacy.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Prototype Device
Among known piezoelectric sensors, PVDF piezopolymer is usually
used in low-frequency applications [7, 38]. Therefore, we build the
prototype of H2B using off-the-shelf PVDF piezopolymer sensors
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(25 × 13 × 1mm3, US$5.6, see Figure 8), produced by TE Connectiv-
ity4. The sensor features 180 Hz resonant frequency and 50 mV/g
baseline sensitivity. The data logger used is the SensorTag produced
by Texas Instruments5. Piezo sensors are sampled by the on-board
12-bit Analog-to-Digital (ADC), and all data samples are stored on
the onboard flash memory.
eck
Chest
Wrist
Ankle
Waist
SensorTag Piezo Sensor
Figure 8: Prototype and data collection.
5.2 Data Collection
We collect a dataset using the designed prototype device6. The
dataset consists of 23 healthy subjects (7 females and 16 males)
aged from 24 to 40 with different skin tones. During data collection,
we attach 5 prototype devices on the participant’s neck, chest, wrist,
waist and ankle respectively as shown in Figure 8. The participants
are asked to stand static, though we find that other still activities
such as sitting and lying does not affect the performance. However,
H2B does not apply to activities involving large body movements
such as walking and running, and We will discuss this limitation
in Section 6 later. Each experiment lasts for 5 minutes and the
sampling rate is 400Hz.
5.3 Impact of Sampling Rate
We find that the sampling rate will affect how much entropy that
can be extracted from measured IPI values. This is because the
sampling rate determines the precision of measurement: the higher
the sampling rate is, the more accurate the measured IPI is, so is
noise. Therefore, the measurements will have more entropy with
the increase of sampling rates. The measurements contain two
parts: useful IPI (used to generate keys) and noise. As the entropy
is a physical feature of a source, it has an upper limit. Although
the entropy of measurements increases as sampling rate increases,
the entropy of the generated key will not increase after it reaches a
maximum value. In other words, there exist a threshold for sampling
rate over which the entropy of the generated keys will not improve.
4Piezo sensor LDT0-028K: http://www.te.com/global-en/product-CAT-PFS0006.html
5SensorTag: http://www.ti.com/ww/en/wireless_connectivity/sensortag2015
/index.html
6Ethical approval has been granted by the corresponding organization (Approval
Number HC17008)
To investigate this threshold, we downsample the dataset from
400Hz to 40Hz to find out how much entropy can be extracted for
different sampling rate.
Figure 9: Impact of sampling rate on entropy.
Figure 9 illustrates the impact of sampling rate on entropy. We
can see that the entropy of measurements is positively related to
the sampling rate as expected. After we separate the entropy of
generated keys and that of random noise, we find that the entropy of
generated keys reaches an upper limit (2.9 bits) and do not increase
further. The results suggest that even if we increase sampling rates,
the entropy of the generated keys will not increase. Therefore, we
set sampling rate to 120Hz in H2B to save energy for resource-
constrained wearable devices. In subsequential experiments and
evaluation sections, we downsample the raw dataset from 400Hz
to 120Hz to examine the performance at the desired sampling rate.
5.4 CS-based Reconciliation v.s. ECC
We benchmark the performance of the proposed CS-based recon-
ciliation method against the state-of-the-art Error Correction Code
(ECC)-based reconciliation [22, 42, 44] using the collected dataset.
Among various ECC methods, we select (15,3) Reed-Solomon (RS)
code as it shows better performance in key reconciliation process
than others as described in [42].
The major performance metric for symmetric key generation
system is the probability that two keys generated by Alice and
Bob can completely agree with each other. The probability of 100%
matching, or noted as success rate, is an important metric because
only 1 bit mismatching can cause protocol failure. As a result, the
key generation process has to re-start which results in prolonged
delays, user dissatisfaction and extra device energy consumption.
As most current cryptographic systems require key length of
128 bits, we compare the success rate of CS-based reconciliation
and ECC-based reconciliation to generate 128-bit keys. Evaluation
results shows that the success rate of CS-based reconciliation ap-
proach is 95.6% while RS(15,3) achieves 34.2% success rate only.
The poor performance of ECC-based reconciliation approach on
this dataset is due to the high mismatched rates after quantization
process that exceed the correction ability of ECC.
5.5 Impact of Different Body Locations
We examine the success rates of H2B for the devices on five different
body locations: chest, neck, wrist, waist, and ankle, and Figure 10
shows the success rates on all pairing combinations. The highest
success rate is 100% when pairing a device on chest with another
on waist because the chest and the waist are close to each other,
and both piezo sensors on these two locations measure SCG signal.
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We also find that all pairing attempts with the device on the ankle
result in success rates that are lower than 95% (though larger than
90%). This is because ankle is the farthest location from the heart
and there is a tiny delay when heartbeat signal is propagated from
the chest (heart) to the ankle as shown in Figure 11.
Figure 10: The success rate of different pairs of body loca-
tions: C-chest, N-neck, R-wrist, W-waist, A-ankle.
Figure 11: Time delay in IPI measured on ankle from that
measured on chest or waist.
5.6 Randomness of Keys
To validate the randomness of H2B keys, we apply the NIST sta-
tistical test [31] to the generated keys after quantization. P-values
in Table 5 represent the probability that the dataset are generated
from a random process. If a p-value is less than a threshold (usually
1% or 5%), the randomness hypothesis is rejected. Table 5 shows
that all NIST tests have p-values larger than 1%. However, as a truly
random source would have p-values from NIST tests uniform on
[0,1] as described in [31], future work could provide more evidence
on whether or not H2B keys truly meet the randomness condition.
Table 4: NIST Test Results
NIST Test p-value
Frequency 0.095581
FFT Test 0.046782
Longest Run 0.050684
Linear Complexity 0.985610
Block Frequency 0.208905
Cumulative Sums 0.098443
Approximate Entropy 1
Non overlapping Template 0.018382
5.7 Resiliency against Attacks
As discussed in Section 3.2, we model three types of attacks, by
which Eve tries to derive a key. Here, we analyze the security of
H2B against these attacks. The metric used in this section is the
average bit agreement rate, which is different from success rate in
previous evaluation. Bit agreement rate is the portion of matching
bits over all bits in a key. A successful key generation process needs
to produce a symmetric key with 100% agreement rate.
5.7.1 Passive Attack. In an passive attack, Eve attempts to pair
her device with the legitimate devices on a user by using her own
heartbeat data. We simulate this scenario by pairing devices from
the same body location but different users. For example, we pair
the device on chest of subject 1 to the devices on the chest of other
subjects to see if they can generate the same key. The results of
passive attack is shown in Figure 12. We can see that passive attack
can at most achieve 70% agreement rate. Therefore, different users
produce distinguishable heartbeat signals and H2B utilizes this
characteristic to generate different keys.
5.7.2 Active Presentation Attack. In presentation attacks, we as-
sume Eve can access the historical IPI data of a user and use these
data to pair with the legitimate devices of the user in current time.
To simulate this scenario, we segment the data of each user into
two equal parts. The first half part is used as historical data to
pair the second half part of the same user. The results in Figure 12
show that presentation attacks can achieve slightly higher agree-
ment rate than passive attacks because the data are form the same
user. However, it can at most achieve 75% agreement rate which in
turn demonstrates the randomness of IPI over time and hence the
security of H2B against this type of attacks.
Figure 12: Passive and presentation attacks.
5.7.3 Active Video Attack. Recently Wu et. al. [39] developed a
video magnification procedure that is capable of revealing bio-
signals from a video footage of a person. The video is decomposed
spatially and temporally to amplify variations occurring within
a specified frequency (e.g., heart beating frequency range in our
context). The technique has been employed in many applications
including adult and infant heart beating tracking[13, 39].We assume
that an attacker Eve can film a video of user’s face and apply such
technique to extract IPI data. She then use the extracted IPI data to
launch an active attack attempt.
To simulate this attack, we ask a user to directly face a video
camera situated at a very close distance to produce the best IPI
results, which is an unfair advantage given to Eve deliberately. A
video of the user’s face is analyzed using Eulerian Video Magnifica-
tion [39] to extract the heart beating details as shown in Figure 13.
The video frame rate is set to 30 and 120 fps respectively and the
region of interest (ROI) is set to part of the user’s forehead. Due to
the presence of noise in the video, the amplification is implemented
by using a narrow band filter 0.5 - 1.4 Hz as recommended in [39],
and the magnification factor is 60.
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(a) Original frame. (b) Magnified frame with red box as ROI.
(c) Pixel intensities in ROI.
(d) Intensity curves and extracted peaks.
Figure 13: Active video attack.
By tracking the changes in mean intensity of pixels in ROI, Eve
can obtain a heartbeat curve as shown in Figure 13(d). The raw IPIs
are extracted using a peak detection algorithm. According to [2],
the magnification method for detecting heart rates is not accurate
as ECG biosensors. On the other hand, as discussed in Section 2.1,
the performance of piezo sensor is close to ECG biosensors. There-
fore, we can expect that the IPIs estimated from video attacks are
different from that measured by piezo sensors. Indeed, the estima-
tion differences of piezo sensor and video attacks can be up to 30%
on our dataset.
By using the IPI values estimated from video analysis to pair
with those produced by the piezo sensor, the agreement rate is
64.53% for 30fps video, and 66.67% for 120fps video, respectively.
This result validates our analysis above, i.e., the IPI values extracted
from the video do not have good proximity with those from the
piezo sensors. Moreover, to process a 90s video (approximate time of
sufficient number of IPI values for H2B to produce 128-bit keys), the
processing time is 16 minutes for the 30fps video, and 75 minutes
for the 120fps video respectively with a computer that has 8GB
RAM and an Intel i7 processor. Therefore, the valid period of the
secret keys may be set to a short duration (e.g., 5 minutes) to protect
against this types of attacks.
Finally, as in passive and active presentation attacks, active video
attacks have 0 success rate. The analysis indicates H2B is highly
attack-proof on three types attacks.
5.8 Power Consumption
Power consumption of H2B can result from three parts: data sam-
pling, data processing, and data transmission. Due to recent devel-
opment in ambient backscatter communication [17, 21], the energy
consumption of wireless communication is negligible for transmis-
sion. Therefore, we focus on evaluation of power consumption in
data sampling and processing only.
5.8.1 Power Consumption of Data Sampling. In our powermeasure-
ment experiment, we connect the prototype device to a GDS-800
digital oscilloscope 7 tomeasure the average power consumption for
each sampling event. The measurement setup is shown in Figure 14.
The SensorTag was running with the latest version of Contiki OS,
7GDS-800: http://www.gwinstek.com/en-GB/products/GDS-800
Figure 14: Power consumption of data sampling.
in which the MCU was duty-cycled to save power. Moreover, all un-
necessary components, including the ADC, SPI bus, and on-board
sensors were powered-off when possible.
Our measurement shows that the sampling rate of 120 Hz results
in 491.55µW power consumption in sampling the heartbeat signal.
The capacity of a typical battery for SensorTag, such as Panasonic
CR2032, is 3 V, 225 mAh which is equivalent to 2.43 × 106 mJ.
Therefore, a typical battery can support piezo data continuously
sampling at 120 Hz for 4.96 × 106 s (≈ 57 days).
5.8.2 Time and Energy Consumption of Reconciliation. The most
computational intensive operation in H2B is CS-based reconcilia-
tion. However, although ℓ1 optimization is known to be computa-
tionally intensive, the reconciliation only requires to be executed in
one of the two devices. It enables H2B to exploit the heterogeneity of
wearable IoT architecture. For example, during the key generation
process, we can choose the device with more processing power such
as smartwatch to run reconciliation process. The less powerful de-
vices such as IMDs needs to transmit messages only. Therefore, we
evaluate the power consumption of reconciliation on two modern
wearable devices: Samsung Smartwatch and Google Nexus 4. The
size of sensing matrix Φ is empirically chosen to be 50 × 128 as
discussed in Section 4.3. The ℓ1 optimization used in the system is
ℓ1-Homotopy [9].
Table 5: Time and energy consumption of reconciliation.
Device Time(ms) Energy(mJ)
Samsung Smartwatch 135 83.8
Google Nexus 4 155 143.2
Table 5 shows the mean result of the time and energy consump-
tion in one reconciliation process. The results are obtained by run-
ning reconciliation 50 times and measured by a widely used open
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source tool PowerTutor8. Let us take Google Nexus 4 as an example.
According to the results, CS-based reconciliation takes 155 ms and
143.2 mJ on average. The average key generation rate of H2B is
approximately 3 bit/s . Therefore, it takes approximately 42.7s to
generate a 128-bit key. Consequently, the processing time of 155
ms for CS-based reconciliation is only a small fraction of the total
key generation process. The battery capacity of Google Nexus 4 is
3.8 V, 2100 mAh which is equivalent to 2.9 × 104J. For example, if a
user run H2B for 24 hours and generate a new key every 5 minutes,
which can be considered as an extreme case, the energy consumed
by CS-based reconciliation is 0.09% of the total energy in Google
Nexus 4 only.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Piezo Sensor v.s. ECG
In this subsection, we benchmark the piezo sensor against ECG
biosensor. For ECG biosensor, we use Neurosky’s TGAM1 ECG
biosensor9 as the baseline. As shown in Table 6, the advantage of
piezo sensor is that it is smaller, more light, and more cost and
power efficient compared to ECG sensors. Moreover, piezo sensors
do not require skin contact when they measure SCG on the chest
or waist while ECG sensors always need skin contact.
Table 6: Comparison between piezo and ECG sensor.
Size Weight Power Price
(mm3) (g) (mW) (US$)
Piezo Sensor 25 × 13 × 1 0.05 0.49 5.6
ECG Sensor 27.9 × 15.2 × 2.5 0.13 2.5 55
Apart from piezo and ECG sensors, IPI values can be also mea-
sured by PPG sensors and accelerometers. PPG sensors that require
the operation of LED that consumes more power. A state-of-the-
art PPG sensor AnalogDevices ADPD2212 10 consumes power of
2.8mW in operation. A recent study [41] shows that piezo sensor-
based gait recognition system can save by 78.15% compared to
accelerometers. Therefore, H2B shows advantages over such sen-
sors in terms of power savings.
6.2 Limitations
In this paper, we show the potential of using wearable piezo sensors
to detect heartbeat signal and further utilize IPI information to gen-
erate keys. Although piezo sensors are not widely used in common
wearable devices at the moment, more and more commercial de-
vices have emerged in the market as discussed in Section 1.With the
advancement of technology especially self-powering techniques,
PEH or piezo sensors will be embedded in more future wearable
devices. Therefore, we believe H2B makes a humble step towards
securing the communication of these wearable devices.
Another limitation is that the key generation rate of H2B is
2.9 bit per IPI. Therefore, it takes approximately 40 seconds to
generate a 128-bit key as a typical heart rate is 60 - 100 beats per
minute [24]. In fact, this is a common problem in IPI-based key
generation system because the limited entropy contained in the IPI.
8http://ziyang.eecs.umich.edu/projects/powertutor/
9http://neurosky.com/biosensors/ecg-sensor/
10http://www.analog.com/cn/products/adpd2212.html
For example, the key generation rate of two recent work H2H [30]
and IMDGuard [40] is 4 bit per IPI. The lower key generation rate
of H2B is because the signal measured by piezo sensors has low
SNR.
In the current design, H2B only works when a user is in static
activities such as sitting, standing still and lying. This is because
piezo sensors are sensitive to all kinds of body motion artifacts.
Therefore, the large motions will overwhelm the weak heartbeat
signal when the user is moving. To address this problem, more
advanced signal processing approaches are required such as source
separation technique, which we leave as future work.
In Section 4.3.2, we defined two possible vulnerabilities and
three attack attempts and found a security boundary M < Q to
protect these vulnerabilities. However, there may be other potential
vulnerabilities due to the information leakage and there is also a
possibility that effective attacks exploiting Vulnerability 2 may be
developed in the future. Future work could provide comprehensive
study on computational secrecy of CS-based reconciliation protocol
theoretically.
7 RELATEDWORK
Biometrics has been well developed in two types of applications
in the security of wearable devices, i.e. user authentication and
symmetric key generation. Authentication systems [36, 41] exploit
a unique pattern (distinctiveness) for each individual. The pattern
must be time-invariant so that the user can be identified by the
corresponding feature set. Therefore, authentication systems usu-
ally normalize biometrics to remove randomness over time. On
the contrary, symmetric key generation systems [32, 42] need to
exploit both distinctiveness and randomness of biometrics. Ran-
domness over time (forward secrecy) can ensure that an attacker
cannot guess the key from past data. Therefore, a symmetric key
generation system usually extracts time-variant biometric features.
Our work is a symmetric key generation system so we highlight
this difference.
Biometrics is the most popular trend in key generation for BAN.
Among all biometrics, IPI is the most common choice of key ma-
terial. This trend starts from Poon et. al [27] when they exploited
IPIs as the entropy source. The systems exploited IPIs include IMD-
Guard [40], OPFKA [15], ESDS [45], Heart2Heart [30]. The previous
works focus on either ECGs or PPG signals to extract IPIs. To the
best of our knowledge, using IPI measured by piezo sensor has
not been studied. To this end, H2B presents a humble first step to
develop a cryptographic system based on IPIs extracted from noisy
piezo signals.
8 CONCLUSION
We proposed and implemented a shared secret key generation sys-
tem, called H2B, for secure BAN communications. H2B allows two
wearable devices to dynamically generate the same key on-the-fly
based on the IPI measured by inexpensive and energy efficient but
noisy piezo sensors. By employing an quantile-based quantization
and a CS-based reconciliation, H2B can successfully pair two wear-
able devices on the same user’s body with a probability of 95.6%.
We also demonstrate that H2B is secured against three types of
typical attacks and very power-efficient.
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